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A W T I O N SAFETYAS A FUNCTION OF PILOT EXPERIENCE:
MTIONALE OR RATIONALIZATION?
Bill D. Bell, Charles L. Robertson, and Gregory S. Wagner

Editor's Note: This arficle originally appeared in the Spring 1992 issue. It is reprinted due to its continuing value
and timeliness.
This study tests the effectiveness of an experience model in predicting aviation safety behavior. The
elements comprising the model include: (a) flight hours, (b) ratings and flight characteristics, (c) career status,
and (d) malfunction history. Data were derived from a random sample of U.S. pilots in Fall 1990 by means
of a survey instrument. Significant variance in aviation safety is not explained by the model. T h e key predictor
of safety behavior is the career status (i.e., certificate duration) of the pilot. Flight hours, ratings, and
malfunction history are negatively and non-significantly associated with aviation safety. The research: (a) questions the use of these variables in ex post facto "explanations" of aviation safety, and (b) suggests a topology
for examining safety behavior.
THE PROBLEM IN PERSPECTIVE
Pilot experience is an ill-defined variable in aviation safety literature (Campbell, 1987; Schiff, 1985, 1987;
Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association [AOPA], 1987ab). Although its definition is frequently unspecified, it
generally refers to the accumulated wisdom attendant on
involvement in flight activities (Kershner, 1981, 1985).
The experienced pilot, for example, is regarded as a good
pilot, as a safe pilot, and as an individual whose
understandings, judgments, and actions bespeak reliable,
conscientious behavior.
As an explanatory variable, however, experience
has not been generally explored from an empirical
standpoint. For the most part, its nature, composition,
and importance have been inferred from three sources:
(1)
the air transportation industry
(2)
public media
(3)
various accident investigation
organizations (e.g., N a t i o n a l
Transportation Safety Board [NTSB],
AOPA, etc.)
Generally speaking, air transportation employers associate pilot experience with specified degrees of flight
activity (Schiff, 1985, 1987; Taneja, 1989) and, in this
regard, they often require of employees a certain number
-

of flight hours, specific ratings, and exposure to a variety
of aircraft types. This pre-employment criteria assumes
that one who meets these requirements will exhibit more
knowledge of the field, make sounder safety judgments,
and engender greater confidence in the public mind than
less experienced pilots. In addition, it is considered that
such individuals are more easily trained and involve fewer
costs to the company.
The philosophy of air transportation employers
is echoed by the public media and numerous private,
federal, and international agencies (Federal Aviation
Administration [FAA], 1977, 1980a-b, 1985b-h; AOPA,
1987a-b; International Civil Aviation Organization
[ICAO], 1987a-f).
Perhaps the most frequent media commentary to
follow a major air catastrophe is the lack of flight time
and aircraft familiarization of one or more members of
the ill-fated crew. The same impression can be gleaned
from examination of NTSB accident statistics (NTSB,
1987a-g).
These statistics, like comments from the public
media, give the impression that flight experience is a
matter of: (a) accumulated flight time, (b) time in type,
and (c) the recency of flight activities (e.g., last 30 days,
last 90 days, etc.).

--
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It should be pointed out that, with the exception
of the air transportation argument as to the costs
involved in pilot training, all explanations of aviation
safety relative to pilot experience have been ex post facto
in nature. That is, both media pronouncements and
accident statistics have attempted to assess experience
only after tragedies have occurred. To date, no research
has attempted to examine contemporary safety practice
with respect to flight (i.e., pilot) experience.
The purpose of the present research is two-fold.
The first is to suggest a theoretical orientation that can
be used to address the cumulative assumptions of pilot
experience. Of interest here is the internalizationof those
norms and values associated with safety practice, as well
as an examination of factors that strengthen or diminish
these orientations. The second is to examine pilot
experience in relation to current safety practice. Ex post
facto "explanationsNafford limited insight into the matter
at hand. Our first point of departure concerns the extent
to which a continuous or discontinuous pattern of
socialization affects safety practice.
THE SOCL4LIZATION THEORY
AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
Socialization is an interactional process whereby
a person's behavior is modified to conform to
expectations held by members of the group to which they
belong or aspire (Brim, 1967; Hill, 1960). Such behavior
includes not only the process by which the individual
acquires the ways of persons around him or her, but also
the process by which an adult takes on behavior
appropriate to the expectations associated with a new
position in a group (Hill, 1960). Socialization processes
are especially active each time a person occupies a new
position, as when joining a fraternity or sorority, being
promoted in a business organization, becoming a parent,
or being inducted into any special group (Goode, 1957).
In essence, socialization concerns the attitudinal and
behavioral changes that occur through learning.
Socialization theorists suggest that the
acquisition of ideas, beliefs, attitudes, and values is eased
by the participatory integration of the individual into the
group context (Ferster and Skinner, 1957; Goode, 1960;
Kohlberg, 1963). That is, effective socialization is
impossible under conditions where the individual is
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isolated from the system into which helshe is being
socialized. Frequent interaction, it is argued, will lead to
a more effective involvement of the participants in group
life.
Socialization is further eased when the norms
and other expectational aspects of the group are focused
or specific in nature (Bell, 1968). Generalized expectations appear to require a longer interactional commitment of group members than do those which are codified
or directive in scope. Generalized expectations often
involve identification with specific role models (i.e.,
significant others), especially models who can be put in
dramatic focus (Bandura, 1962, 1969; Bandura et.al.,
1963, 1967). Formalized expectations can be presented in
an instructional format where conformity can be more
easily assessed (Bell, 1968).
In addition, socialization effectiveness is increased as the instructional aspects of group membership
are intensified (Hill, 1x0). Increased social and
psychological commitment to the group situation as well
as the frequency and intensity of socialization efforts
combine to ground the individual more completely in the
normative milieu of group life. Socialization theorists
argue that this greater integration leads to a more
comprehensive identification with the group per se
(Ferster and Skinner, 1957; Kohlberg, 1969). The overall
effect is to make the individual more susceptible to those
social control mechanisms (i.e., positive and negative
sanctions) that regulate normative compliance.
Socialization,although influential in establishing
attitudinal and behavioral predispositions,is not a unitary
process (Merton, 1957). It functions in an environment
of many social groups with competing allegiances.
Accordingly, socialization should not be thought of as
molding a person to a standard social pattern. Individuals
are subjected to different combinations of socialization
pressures, and they react differently to them. Consequently, socialization processes can produce distinctive
differences, as well as similarities, among persons.
Finally, socialization does not stop at a certain
age, but continues throughout life (Brim, 1967).
Therefore, life experiences representing competing group
involvements act to modify or condition the attitudes,
beliefs, and values as well as behavioral patterns
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established earlier. Socialization theorists posit that
congruence in group experience provides reinforcement
to many pre-established behavioral patterns (Gewirtz et
al., 1956). Generally speaking, patterns of behavior that
rehearse or dramatize a previously learned expectation
aid in " f ~ n g nthis dimension in the individual's
behavioral repertoire.
Within the confines of aviation, continued flight
activities may be seen as calling forth this repetitive
dimension. Accordingly, those respondents with greater
flight experience are expected to exhibit more consistently positive safety behavior.
A corollary is suggested relative to the above
hypothesis. It must be recalled that socialization is a
group phenomenon. Within a group context, an
individual is exposed to an interactional process whereby
behavior is modified to conform to expectations held by
group members. As has been suggested, increased
integration in the group elicits a more comprehensive
identification with group members and their normative
expectations for behavior. It follows that in those
instances where individuals are temporally or
geographically separated from the group involvement,
socialization effectiveness should be diminished.
In the arena of modern aviation, it is possible to
differentiate participants (i.e., pilots) by means of an
avocation/profession dichotomy. For a significant number
of pilots, flying is incidental to a host of other life
activities. An avocation, as opposed to a profession,
implies less consistent behavioral involvement. In
addition, monetary compensation is normally characteristic of the latter rather than the former. For the avocational pilot, flight-related activities are more personalized
and less group oriented. The professional pilot, on the
other hand, is not only compensated for flight, but
performs within the context of a formal occupation. The
professional's occupational involvement is characterized
by considerable formality, symbolic identification (e.g.,
uniforms, ranks, professional memberships, etc.),
institutionalized training requirements, and both formal
and informal mechanisms of social control. From the
standpoint of socialization theory, opportunities for
interactive identification, behaviors specificity, and
expectational rehearsal should be greater for the profes-
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sional pilot. Accordingly, it is hypothesized that
professional pilots will exhibit more consistently positive
safety behavior than will their avocational counterparts.
In summary, then, socialization theory
acknowledges the importance of group and interactional
involvement in the formulation of attitudes and
behavioral expectations. It describes the manner in which
attitudes, beliefs, and values are internalized. It
emphasizes those factors deemed essential to successful
socialization. And, within the framework of the present
research, it suggests a model by means of which
behavioral expression may be predicted.
THE RESPONDENT SELECTION PROCESS
The data presented here comes from a sample of
U.S. registered pilots polled in Fall 1990 by means of a
survey instrument. Procedurally, the entire population of
registered pilots in the United States was enumerated as
710,000. lbenty thousand of the registered pilots who
were non-residents of the 50 states were subsequently
excluded from the model to maintain a homogenous
flying environment. From the remaining (N=690,000)
registered pilots with U.S. residence, a systematic
selection procedure was used on the ZIP code ordered
list to obtain a nationwide representative sample of 2,500.
Survey questionnaires were mailed to selected pilots. A
total of 959 surveys were received, constituting a return
rate of 38.4%. No followup measures were instituted.
The respondents ranged in age from 18 to 86
years (the mean age was 43.3 years). Some 51.1% of the
respondents were between 18 and 42 years old. Occupationally, for 71.4% of the sample pilots, flying was an
avocational and non-monetarily compensated activity.
Among this subgrouping were farmers, service workers,
and laborers (24.7%); clerical workers, salesmen,
operatives, and craftsmen (35.4%); and professional, technical, and managerial workers (39.9%). The mean
educational level of the overall sample was 15.4 years, a
figure well above the national average for the general
population (Cremin, 1988).
In addition, 96.5% of the sample were Caucasian;
91.4% were presently employed; 78.8% owned their own
homes; and 85.5% had learned to fly in a civilian
environment. Finally, the median annual income was
slightly less than $42,500.
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MAJOR VARIABLES AND
RESEARCH FOCUS
Pilot Experience
Pilot experience focuses on the continuing nature
of socialization and recognizes the fact that ongoing life
experiences act to modify or condition attitudes, beliefs,
and values as well as behavior patterns established
earlier. As Gewirtz et al. (1956) point out, congruence in
group experience provides reinforcement to many preestablished behavioral patterns. Generally speaking,
patterns of behavior that rehearse or dramatize a
previously learned expectation (e.g., safety behavior)
" dimension in the individual's
should aid in " f ~ n g this
behavioral repertoire. As repetitive behavior is taken to
reflect normative and/or expectational rehearsal, attention
was focused on the temporal aspects of this dimension.
For operational purposes, a panel of 10 aviation
educators was polled to elicit those factors most
indicative of pilot experience. The factors suggested
included:
(1)
flight hours
(2)
ratings and flight classifications
(3)
career status
malfunction history
(4)
Respondents were asked to indicate their total
flight hours in all aircraft, the number of ratings held
with respect to all aircraft classifications, the duration of
their pilot certificates, and an enumeration of the number
and types of flight malfunctions experienced over their
aviation careers. These numbers were totaled in each

category and used as indicators of overall flight (i.e.
pilot) experience.
Aviation Safety

From a conceptual standpoint, aviation safety
was considered a set of socially conditioned attitudes,
beliefs, and values specific to the arena of flight. These
elements, it is argued, are internalized to varying degrees
and behaviorally modified by a variety of social and
experiential components. As such, it can be viewed as a
product of the socialization process. For the purposes of
this research, aviation safety constituted a particular
predisposition toward eliminating human error and its
attendant consequences in the aviation environment.
From an operational standpoint, aviation safety
was assessed by the extent to which the respondent
reported compliance with five safety-related behaviors
associated with preflight preparation. These behaviors
included:
the performance of a thorough
(1)
walk-around inspection
a through check of the weather
(2)
before flight
(3)
the computation of fuel
requirements with regard to
appropriate reserves
the computation of takeoff and
(4)
landing distance as well as
runway lengths at all airports
(5)
the use of a checklist for
interior and exterior inspections

Table 1
Preflight Preparation

< Never
1
2
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4

5

Always >
6
7
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The respondent was presented a 7-item scale (see
Table 1) with respect to each safety behavior and asked
the extent to which they perform each item before flight.
The scales were anchored with the bipolar responses
"Never" and "Always." All responses were subsequently
totaled to form a Aviation Safety Index.
THE RESULTS OF ANALYSIS
A standard multiple regression was performed, to
determine the effect of pilot experience on aviation
safety, for the Aviation Safety Index as the dependent
variable (DV) and flight hours, ratings, career status, and
malfunction history as independent variables. Analysis
was performed for evaluation of assumptions, i.e. that
Pilot Safety Behavior improves with an increase in pilot
experience.
Results of evaluation of assumptions led to
transformation of the variables to reduce skewness in
their distributions, reduce the number of outliers, and
improve the normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity of
residuals. Logarithmic transformations were used on the
Aviation Safety Index (LOG-SAFE), Career Status
(LOG-YEAR), Flight Hours (LOGFEXP), and
Malfunction History (LOG-MALF). One independent
variable, Flight Ratings and Classifications, was positively
skewed without transformation and negatively skewed
with it; hence, it was not transformed. With the use of
a p <.001 criterion for mahalanobis distance, 10 outliers

among the cases were found and subsequently excluded.
Seven additional cases had missing data and were deleted
from analysis. Analysis was limited to the remaining 942
respondents. To detect the interactive effects of
combinations of independent variables; flight hours,
ratings, career status, and malfunction history; multiwIlinearity and singularity investigations of the independent
variables were performed and proved negative.
Table 2 displays the correlations between the
variables, comparing the predictors to determine which
one is more important, using the unstandardized
regression coefficients (B) and intercept, the standardized
regression coefficients (fi),
the semipartial
correlations(sh), and R, Rh,and adjusted RB.R for the
regression was not significantly different from zero,
F(4,937)=2.21, pc.07, hence the regression exercise has
not helped to explain the dependent variable (Aviation
Safety Index). One regression coefficient does differ
significantly from zero, using a 95% confidence limit
calculation. The confidence limits for the Career Status
(LOGYEAR) variable were -0.0321 to -0.0049.
Only one of the independent variables
contributed significantly to predicting the Aviation Safety
Index, respondent's logarithmical transf0rmed"career
status ( s h = .008). The four independent variables in
combination contributed a .001 in shared variability;
however, altogether only 0.9% (0.5% adjusted) of the

Table 2

-

-

pc.01

*

- -

unique variability = ,008;
shared variability = .001
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variability in aviation safety scores was predicted by
knowing scores on these four independent variables.
Although correlations between the log of
aviation safety and the logs of flight hours and
malfunctions were -.035 and -.036 respectively, neither
variable contributed significantly to regression. The same
was true of the correlation between log of aviation safety
and flight ratings and classifications (-.036).
Post hoc evaluation of these correlations
revealed none to be significantly different from zero
[F(4,937)= 1.87, p <.17; F(4,937) = .204, p < .65; and
F(4,937) = .523, p c .47, respectively]. It seems clear that
flight experience (i.e., hours, ratings, and malfunction
history) contribute negligibly (both singularly and jointly)
to variance in reported safety behavior.
From the results presented in Table 2, it would
appear that the research hypothesis has not been
confirmed by the data. Safety behavior is not observed to
be positively associated with the independent variables in
question. On the contrary, all correlations are negative.
Although these associations are not statistically
significant, they relegate to rationalization the
relationship of pilot experience with improved safety
practice.
Table 3, seeking to account for differences
among pilots, shows a measure of how different the
Safety Behavior Indices are. It provides test of the
avocation-profession corollary concerning group
involvement. As hypothesized, a statistically significant
difference is obtained between the aviation safety scores
of avocational (i.e., non-monetarily compensated) and
professional (i.e., monetarily compensated) pilots. Indi-

a

viduals compensated for flight activities scored higher
than did their counterparts (F=9.84, p < .001). The
implications for the predictive paradigm are seen in
Tables 4 and 5.
Table 4 represents a standard multiple regression
of flight variables on the safety behavior of avocational
(i.e., non-monetarily compensated) pilots. Only one of
the independent variables contributed significantly to
prediction of aviation safety as logarithmical transformed
flight ratings and classifications (srii=.006). The four
independent variables in combination contributed
another .040 in shared variability. Altogether, 4.6% (4.0%
adjusted) of the variability in aviation safety scores was
predicted by knowing scores on these four independent
variables.
Although the correlations between log of
aviation safety and the logs of career status and flight
hours were -.I55 and -.I74 respectively, neither variable
contributed significantly to regression. The same was true
of the correlation between log of aviation safety and the
log of malfunctions (-.160). Post hoc evaluation of these
correlations revealed none to be significantly different
from zero [F(4,661)= 1.47, p c.23; F(4,661)=.39, p < .39;
and F(4,661) =2.71, pc.10, respectively]. It seems clear
that flight experience (i.e., hours), career status, and
malfunction history contribute negligibly (both singularly
and jointly) to variance in safety behavior.
From the results presented in Table 4, it would
again appear that the research hypothesis has not been
confirmed by the data. Safety behavior among avocational pilots is not observed to be positively associated
with the independent variables in question. On the con-

Table 3
Analysis of Variance of Safety Behavior Indices for
Monetarily" and Non-MonetarilybCompensated Pilots (N=963)
Source
Between Groups
Wihin Groups
Total

Sum of
Squares

df
1

96 1
962

185.0385
18079.6801
18264.7186

Mean Squares
185.0385
18.8134

F

Level of Significance
9.8355

.0013

= 30.1841; Standard Deviation = 4.3828
Mean = 29.2157; Standard Deviation = 4.3190

a Mean
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Table 4
Standard Multiple Regression of Flight Variables on Safety Behavior of Non-Monetarily Compensated Pilots
(N=666)
Variables

LOGSAFE
(Dv)

LOGFMP

LOGMALF

RATINGS

LOGFMP
LOGMALF
RATINGS
LOGYEAR

-.I74
-.I60
-.I78
-.I55

.488
,566
693

.455
.366

.388

Means
Standard Deviations

1.460
.073

2.600
,683

295
.374

1.749
1.158

LOGYEAR

lntercept =
,909
.491

B
-.WO
-.0144
-.0062*
-.0095
1.494

B

-.089

sr2
(unique)

.006

RZ=
=
R=

~2

Adjusted

.046~
.040
.214**

* pc.05

**
a

p<.001
unique variability = .006; shared variability = .040

Table 5
Standard Multiple Regression of Flight Variables on Safety Behavior of Monetarily Compensated Pilots
(N=266)
Variables

LOGSAFE
(Dv)

LOGFEXP
LOGMALF
RATINGS
LOGYEAR
Means
Standard Deviations

LOGFEXP

LOGMALF

RATINGS

.I57
.065
.010
.065

,478
.I79
.828

.455
.366

.I66

1.474
.070

3.579
,571

.295
.374

3.808
2.055

LOGYEAR

lntercept =
1.145
360

B
.0401**
-.0007
-.0005
-.0388
1.377

Adjusted

0

.327

R2 =
RZ =
R=

sr2
(unique)

.031

.038~
.023
.I 94*

pc.05
pc.001
a unique variability = .03l; shared variability = .007

**

trary, all observed correlations are negative. In addition,
these relationships fall short of statistical significance.
Table 5 represents a standard multiple regression of
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prediction of aviation safety as logarithmical transformed
the log of flight hours (srir=.031).The four independent
variables in combination contributed another .007 in
shared variability. Altogether, 3.8% (2.3% adjusted) of
the variability in aviation safety scores was predicted by
knowing scores on these four independent variables.
Although the correlation between log of aviation
safety and log of career status was .067, career status did
not contribute significantly to regression. The same was
true of the correlations with the log of malfunctions and
ratings (.065 and .010, respectively). Post hoc evalua-tions
of these correlations revealed neither to be signifi-cantly
different from zero [F(4,261)= 3.38, p<.07; F(4,261)
=.004, p<.95; and F(4,261) =.057, pe.81, respectively].
It seems clear that career status, flight hours, and
malfunction history contribute negligibly (both singularly
and jointly) to variance in safety behavior.
From observation of Table 5, it would appear that
only one aspect of the research hypothesis has been
confirmed by the data. Specifically, those respondents
indicating greater flight hours exhibited more consistently
positive safety behavior (pe.01). Although the effects of
career status, flight ratings, and malfunction history are
in predicted directions, the associations are not
statistically significant.
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
From the perspective of the present data, little
variance in aviation safety was explained by the
socialization model. With no exceptions, the associates
were contrary to prediction. Most, however, were neither
strong nor statistically significant. It would appear that
aviation safety can not be adequately adduced from a
knowedge of a pilot's flight hours, career status, ratings,
or malfunction history.
A second finding of this research was the suggestion
of group specificity with respect to aviation safety. That
is, when pilots were differentiated into avocational and
professional categories, the model proved somewhat more
useful. Safety index scores were found to be significantly
higher for professional or monetarily-compensatedpilots
than for their avocational peers (F=9.84, pe.001). For
the professional pilots, 3.8% of the variance in aviation
safety was accounted for by the model. Whereas all
model assumptions were borne out by the data, only the
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respondents' flight hours proved statistically significant.
Career status, ratings, and malfunction history were
positively but non-significantly associated with aviation
safety (.07, .01, and .07, respectively).
For avocational or non-monetarily compensated pilots,
on the other hand, 4.6% of the variance in aviation safety
was accounted for by the model. Whereas all variables
were found to be negatively associated with aviation
safety, only the pilot's ratings and classifications proved
statistically significant. As in the case of the total sample,
the associations between flight variables and aviation
safety were negative. In general, it would appear that
these elements provide insufficient rationale for safety
behavior.
LIMITATIONS AND RESEARCH
SUGGESTIONS
The present research is not without its limitations.
The definition of aviation safety is a case in point. From
a theoretical perspective, aviation safety encompasses
both attitudinal and behavioral elements. That is, the
individual's predisposition toward error avoidance
includes not only a repertoire of situation-specific
behaviors, but also numerous understandings (i.e., beliefs)
and feelings about safety practice. In the present
research, only the behavioral dimension was addressed. In
addition, attention was limited to those behaviors
characteristic of a specific flight situation (i.e., preflight)
as opposed to those consistent with a complete flight
scenario: pre-flight, flight, and post-flight. It seems clear
that a more comprehensive test of the socialization
model must incorporate not only a broader range of
safety behavior, but must include cognitive and affective
elements as well.
Secondly, the operationalization of pilot experience
must be expanded. In this research, pilot experience
centered about flight activities. Subsequent research into
pilot behavior indicates not only the multi-faceted
character of pilot experience, but also its socialpsychological dimensions. (Bell et al., 1991a,b,c).
Individuals who view themselves as good pilots, for
example, tend to be more conscientious in terms of safety
behavior. In this regard, it is suggested that subsequent
research address an individual's aviation-related attitudes,
beliefs, and values as well as hours, ratings, etc., in
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assessing pilot experience.
Finally, the present data are associated with a crosssectional design. As such, they represent only a snapshot

in time. To assess changes in behavior over time, a
longitudinal format would be desirable.0
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